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THE BUTLER DID IT!!!: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EXCITED
UTTERANCE EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE
AS APPLIED IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT

"How do you recognize an excited utterance? I can tell you. If hearsay is
offered and it begins with 'My God, 'and ends with an exclamation point,
it is an excited utterance.'

I.

INTRODUCTION

Two frightened men approach a police officer walking the beat. The
men are extremely upset and nervous, claiming there is a man two blocks
away who is wielding a gun and threatening to "shoot somebody." The
officer accompanies the men to where they saw the individual with the
gun and observes the individual a block and a half away from his original
location. After subduing the threatening individual, the officer arrests the
man and books him. At the defendant's trial for gun possession, the officer testifies in open court. When he reports that two men approached
him and said there was a man with a gun claiming he was going to "shoot
somebody," the defendant's attorney objects to the officer's testimony on
the basis of hearsay. The trial court properly admits the officer's testimony into evidence under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay
2
rule.
This Casebrief concerns the familiar, common law hearsay exception
for excited utterances, codified by Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2). 3 Although the premise of the excited utterance exception may seem simple
on its face, the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals have developed
various methods for determining when hearsay evidence is admissible
under the exception. 4 Manyjudicial opinions and scholars approve of the
excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule; nevertheless, some re1. IRVING YOUNGER, THE SECTION OF LITIGATION MONOGRAPH SERIES, No.

AN IRREVERENT INTRODUCTION TO HEARSAY

33 (1977)

3:

[hereinafter YOUNGER, IRREV-

ERENT INTRODUCTION].

2. The facts in this hypothetical are similar to the facts in the case of United

States v. Brown, 254 F.3d 454, 456-57 (3d Cir. 2001).
3. See Brown, 254 U.S. at 458 (acknowledging excited utterance exception as
"a long recognized one"); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Excited Utterances and Family Violence, 15-WTR CRIM. JUST. 39, 39 (2001) (observing excited utterance exception to
hearsay rule as "well-known, common law hearsay exception"). Black's Law Dictionary defines an excited utterance as a statement concerning a startling event while

the declarant is under the stress and excitement caused by the event. See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 585 (7th ed. 1999) (defining excited utterance). Black's recognizes that an excited utterance "may be admissible as a hearsay exception." Id.

4. See FED. R. EvID. 803(2) (defining excited utterance exception to hearsay
rule in one sentence). For explanations of different United States Circuit Courts

(1117)
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main wary of the accuracy of statements that constitute excited
5
utterances.
This Casebrief explores the development of the law surrounding the
excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Part II examines the basics of hearsay to
provide a foundational understanding of why hearsay is generally excluded at trial and moreover, why some hearsay is admissible. 6 Part III
defines and rationalizes the excited utterance exception to the hearsay
rule and explains how the different United States Circuit Courts of Appeals have approached the problem of developing a means for determining when hearsay evidence qualifies under the excited utterance
exception. 7 Part IV analyzes the Third Circuit's approach to the excited
utterance exception in the case United States v. Brown,8 and considers some
9
possible paths for enhancing the Third Circuit's excited utterance law.
Part V provides a brief summary of the hearsay topics discussed in this
Casebrief and the impact that the Third Circuit excited utterance test has
for practitioners. 10
II.

AN

INTRODUCTION TO HEARSAY, ITS GENERAL PROSCRIPTION IN THE

FEDERAL COURTS AND EXCEPTIONS

A.

What Is Hearsay?

The Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as "a statement, other
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." 1 This
of Appeals' approaches regarding the excited utterance exception to the hearsay
rule, see infra notes 35-88 and accompanying text.
5. For a discussion of conflicting views on the accuracy of excited utterances,
see infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
6. For an introductory discussion on hearsay evidence, see infra notes 11-29
and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion on the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule and
the diverse approaches taken by the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals, see infra
notes 35-88 and accompanying text.
8. 254 F.3d 454 (3d Cir. 2001).
9. For an analysis of the Third Circuit's approach to the excited utterance
exception in the case of United States v. Brown and some possible paths for enhancing the Third Circuit's approach, see infra notes 89-120 and accompanying text.
10. For a brief summary of the issues discussed in this Casebrief, see infra
notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
11. FED. R. EvID. 801(c); see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62 n.4 (1980)
("McCormick defines hearsay evidence as 'testimony in court, or written evidence,
of a statement made out of court, the statement being offered as an assertion to
show the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the
credibility of the out-of-court asserter. "'); JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERCER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 801.02[1] (Joseph M. McGlaughlin ed., 2d
ed. 2001) ("Rule 801 defines hearsay as an out-of-court statement offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted."). Federal Rule of Evidence 801 provides the
definition of hearsay and codifies the common law conception of hearsay. See id.
(discussing hearsay evidence).
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somewhat awkward definition can be simplified to the two-pronged "working rule" that hearsay is (1) an out-of-court statement; (2) offered to
proved the truth of the matter asserted.12 An out-of-court statement is an
assertion "made other than formally by a witness during trial of the case at
hand." 13 Out-of-court statements are not hearsay, however, if the statement is offered to prove anything besides the truth of the matter asserted,
making a hearsay determination dependent on the statement's use at
trial. 14
B.

Hearsay Is Not Admissible: A General Rule

Hearsay and its procedures have troubled the legal world with perhaps the most litigated and famous rule from the common law.' 5 The6
seemingly simple hearsay rule is that hearsay is not admissible at trial.'
12. See DAVID F. BINDER, HEARSAY HANDBOOK 7-8 (2d ed. 1983) (providing
both working and Federal Rule of Evidence definition of hearsay); IRVING
A PRACTICAL GUIDE THROUGH THE THICKET 7-9 (1988) [hereinPRACTICAL GUIDE] (recognizing that working rule is necessary for,

YOUNGER, HEARSAY:

after YOUNGER,

trial lawyers to have at their "fingertips in the courtroom" to determine if statements are hearsay); YOUNGER, IRREVERENT INTRODUCTION, supra note 1, at 6-7 (tiding two prong definition of hearsay as "working rule"). Younger discusses the
need for trial lawyers to be able to use the working rule and make an immediate
determination as to whether an out-of-court statement is hearsay or not. See
YOUNGER, PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra, at 7-9 (discussing application of working rule of
evidence). The first test Younger develops for determining whether or not a statement constitutes hearsay is: "Does the answer to [a] question depend for its probative value upon the credibility of someone who cannot be cross-examined?" Id. at
7. Younger concedes, however, that this test is far too cumbersome for the courtroom setting. See id. at 8 (noting complication for lawyers). The question as to
whether or not a statement is hearsay "is addressed to the trial lawyer on the firing
line in the courtroom, who must apply the rule in the hurly-burly circumstances of
a trial." Id. at 7. Because of this, a less complicated rule (the working rule) is
necessary so that trial lawyers can apply it instantaneously with the "ease and simplicity of application of 'two plus two equals four."' Id. at 8.
13. BINDER, supra note 12, at 8 (defining "formally" as "under oath or affirmation subject to the penalty of perjury," with ability for all adverse parties to crossexamine before trier of fact).
14. See Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 219 (1974) (determining that
out-of-court statements were not hearsay because "[o] ut-of-court statements constitute hearsay only when offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted"); BINDER, supra note 12, at 13 (recognizing that use of out-of-court
statement determines whether that statement is hearsay); YOUNGER, PRACTICAL

supra note 12, at 10 (stating that out-of-court statement is not hearsay if it is
offered for "any other purpose in the world' than to prove truth of matter asserted)
(emphasis in original).
15. See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, WITNESS INTIMIDATION: THE LAW'S RESPONSE 5961 (1985) (noting development of hearsay rule in English courts in 1600s);
YOUNGER, PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 12, at 3 (heralding rule that "[h]earsay is
inadmissible" as "[t] he most celebrated rule in the entire seamless web of the common law, the most litigated rule we have, the keystone of the law of evidence...");
WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at § 802.02[1] [a] (observing that one-third of evidence
law concerns hearsay questions).
16. See BINDER, supranote 12, at 58 ("The hearsay rule is a simple one. Hearsay is excludable at trial."); YOUNGER, PRACTICAL GUIDE, supranote 12, at 3 (noting
GUIDE,
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The Federal Rules of Evidence codify this general rule against hearsay evidence in Rule 802.17 Rule 802, however, allows for exceptions to this general proscription against hearsay evidence at trial. 18 Exceptions to the
hearsay rule are numerous, with many provided by sources other than the
Federal Rules of Evidence.19
C.

Rationalefor the Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions

Hearsay is generally inadmissible in American courts because allowing
it can lead to the admission of inaccurate statements at trial. 20 There are
three devices that prevent admitting unreliable statements in court:2 1 (1)
personal in-court oath, (2) personal presence at trial and (3) the possibility of cross-examination. 22 Because a hearsay statement is by definition an
that inadmissibility of hearsay is most basic evidence rule); STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG
ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 802.02[1] (8th ed. 2002) (asserting
that general exclusion of hearsay evidence is basic rule); Aviva Orenstein, "MY
GOD!":A Feminist Critique of the Excited UtteranceException to the Hearsay Rule, 85 CAL.
L. REV. 159, 165 (1997) (providing that out-of-court statements cannot be used to
prove truth of matter asserted). Orenstein clarifies the rule against the admission
of hearsay at trial by stating, "A party cannot introduce a statement made outside
the trial to persuade the trier of fact that the statement is substantively true." Id. at
165.
17. See FED. R. EvID. 802 ("Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by
these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress.").
18. See FED. R. EVID. 803 (allowing for exceptions to hearsay rule); SALTZBURG,
supra note 16, at § 802.02[1] ("[H]earsay is simply inadmissible unless an exception is applicable.").
19. See FED. R. EVID. 803 (providing for exceptions in Federal Rules of Evidence, rules made by Supreme Court and rules made by Act of Congress); Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62 (1980) ("The basic rule against hearsay, of course, is riddled with exceptions developed over three centuries."); YOUNGER, IRREVERENT INTRODUCTION, supra note 1, at 18 (discussing existence of numerous exceptions to
hearsay rule); WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at § 802.02[1] [a] (declaring that most
questions dealing with hearsay rule concern its exceptions). For a discussion concerning the rationale for exceptions to the hearsay rule, see infra notes 21-29 and
accompanying text.
20. See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 598 (1994) ("The hearsay
rule ... is premised on the theory that out-of-court statements are subject to particular hazards. The declarant might be lying; he might have misperceived the events
which he relates; he might have faulty memory; his words might be misunderstood
or taken out of context by the listener."); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,
298 (1973) (grounding hearsay rule on notion that triers of fact should not see
untrustworthy evidence); United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 656 (3d Cir. 1993)
(acknowledging that hearsay statements are inherently "untrustworthy"); WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at § 802.02[3] (stating that hearsay rule seeks to remove dangerous possibility that evidence lacks reliability); Orenstein, supra note 16, at 166
(observing that hearsay lacks assurances of reliability).
21. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at § 802.02[2] [a]-[c] (listing and explaining
three devices that help ensure reliability of statements).
22. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (determining that dangers of admitting out-of-court statements are overcome by (1) witness giving statement under oath, (2) having witness sit in front ofjury for observance of witness'
demeanor and (3) exposing witness to cross-examination, "the 'greatest legal en-
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"out-of-court" statement, these devices remain unused on hearsay and cannot assure the statements' reliability. 23 This potential unreliability of hear24
say statements renders them suspect and generally inadmissible at trial.
Nonetheless, if the unreliability of out-of-court statements is overcome, or
some exception justifies the admissibility of hearsay, courts can admit
25
statements that are hearsay.
The list of exceptions to the hearsay rule is so vast that some commentators believe the exceptions essentially "subsume the general rule." 2 6 Sevgine ever invented for the discovery of truth"'); Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S.
243, 273 (1913) (noting that courts exclude hearsay because it lacks safeguards of
oath, presence of declarant in court and ability to cross examine); WEINSTEIN,
supra note 11, at § 802.02[2] [a]-[c] (explaining protections of "(1) the oath, (2)
personal presence at the trial ....and (3) cross-examination"); Orenstein, supra
note 16, at 166 (listing in-court oath, observance of witness demeanor, possibility
of prosecution for perjury and cross-examination as assurances of reliability).
Commentators consider cross-examination to be perhaps the most important device to ensure the trustworthiness of statements at trial. See YOUNGER, IRREVERENT
INTRODUCTION, supra note 1, at 2 (positing that touchstone of common law trial is
cross-examination); JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 1367 (Chadbourne rev. 1974) (cross-examination is "beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth").
23. See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 598 ("[T]he ways in which these dangers are
minimized for in-court statements-the oath, the witness' awareness of the gravity
of the proceedings, the jury's ability to observe the witness' demeanor, and, most
importantly, the right of the opponent to cross-examine-are generally absent for
things said out of court."); WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at § 802.02[3] (noting that
there are currently no protective devices to assure reliability).
24. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 298 (noting that hearsay statements are excluded
because they lack "conventional indicia of reliability: they are usually not made
under oath ...; the declarant's word is not subject to cross-examination; and he is
not available in order that his demeanor and credibility may be assessed by the
jury"); Donnelly, 228 U.S. at 273 (asserting that courts exclude hearsay because "relaxation of the ordinary safeguards must very greatly multiply the probabilities of
error, and that hearsay evidence is an unsafe reliance in a court of justice");
United States v. Parry, 649 F.2d 292, 294 (5th Cir. 1981) (explaining that hearsay
statements are excluded because jury has no basis for evaluating declarant's trustworthiness, thus making hearsay statements unreliable).
25. See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 598 (recognizing that some hearsay evidence is
less susceptible to hearsay dangers); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) ("Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at
least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."); YOUNGER,
PRACTICAL GUIDE, supra note 12, at 45 (explaining that trial judges admit hearsay
evidence when it is not inherently suspect or lacking reliability); Orenstein, supra
note 16, at 167 (acknowledging that hearsay exceptions exist because they belong
to "established categories of statements for which the traditional concern with
sincerity is offset by some presumed guarantee of reliability"). Moreover, "no coherent unifying theory explains the 'crazy quilt' of hearsay exceptions." Id. Additionally, necessity and the adversary system are justifications providing reasons to
admit hearsay into evidence. See id. (citing reasons to admit hearsay evidence).
26. See YOUNGER, IRREVERENT INTRODUCTION, supra note 1, at 19 (speculating
that courts admit hearsay approximately ninety-percent of times when offered); I.
Daniel Stewart, Jr., Perception, Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticismof PresentLaw and the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 1, 7 (noting general rule of
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eral of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, as laid out in Rule 803, allow
courts to receive hearsay evidence without a showing that the declarant is
unavailable. 27 Courts allow these exceptions because "U]udicial experi-

ence has shown these kinds of evidence to be reliable even in the secondhand form that hearsay, by definition, takes." 28 The excited utterance exception falls into a hearsay exception listed in Rule 803.29
excluding hearsay "even though numerous exceptions largely subsume the general
rule");Jack B. Weinstein, ProbativeForce of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REv. 331, 346 (1961)
(referring to excluded hearsay as "a small and lonely island" in sea of admitted
hearsay).
27. See FED. R. EVID. 803 (providing exceptions to hearsay rule); SALTZBURG,
supra note 16, at 803.02[1] (8th ed. 2002) (declaring that rationale for unavailability being irrelevant is that statements coming under Rule 803 exceptions are as
reliable as declarant giving in-court testimony); WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at
§ 803.02 (noting that hearsay allowed without showing that declarant is unavailable under Rule 803). The hearsay exceptions allowed by Rule 803 apply when the
availability of the declarant is immaterial. See FED. R. EvID. 803 (providing exceptions). Moreover, Rule 804 provides hearsay exceptions when the declarant is unavailable as a witness. See FED. R. EvID. 804 (defining unavailability and listing
hearsay exceptions when declarant is unavailable as witness). Furthermore, Rule
807 allows trial courts the discretion to admit other hearsay evidence that is not
explicitly excepted from the hearsay rule by Rule 803 or 804. See FED. R. EvID. 807
(providing "Residual Exception"); WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at § 807.02 (discussing residual exception).
Interestingly, the United States Supreme Court has suggested that almost all
hearsay exceptions require the hearsay declarant to be unavailable, thereby removing the distinction made between the Federal Rules of Evidence 803 and 804 hearsay exceptions. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 (explaining requirement in most cases
that prosecution demonstrate that hearsay declarant is unavailable). Specifically,
the Court stated:
The Confrontation Clause operates in two separate ways to restrict the
range of admissible hearsay. First, in conformance with the Framers'
preference for face-to-face accusation, the Sixth Amendment establishes a
rule of necessity. In the usual case (including cases where prior crossexamination has occurred), the prosecution must either produce, or
demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes
to use against the defendant.
Id. In Roberts, the Court cited several cases supporting this proposition, but recognized that demonstrating unavailability is not always necessary. See id. (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), to support proposition that proof of hearsay
declarant's unavailability is not always necessary). Despite making this distinction
between Federal Rules of Evidence 803 and 804, the Court retreated from potentially canceling the distinction between these two rules in Bourjaily v. United States,
483 U.S. 171 (1987). In Bourjaily, the Court recognized that "Ohio v. Roberts laid
down only 'a general approach to the problem' of reconciling hearsay exceptions
with the Confrontation Clause." Id. at 182. Justice Rehnquist explained that in
some circumstances, demonstrating the unavailability of the declarant is unnecessary when admitting hearsay evidence. See id. (citing United States v. Inadi, 475
U.S. 387 (1986)).

28.

WEINSTEIN,

supra note 11, at § 803.02.

29. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (setting out excited utterance exception to hearsay rule); David v. Pueblo Supermarket, 740 F.2d 230, 235 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating
availability of declarant is immaterial); Saltzburg, supra note 3, at 39 (noting that
exception does not require excited utterance declarant to be unavailable for court
to admit statement).
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THE EXCITED UTrERANCE EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE

A.

The Excited UtteranceException and Its Rationale

Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2) codifies the common-law excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.30 Rule 803(2) states that whether
or not the declarant is available as a witness, "[a] statement relating to a
startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress
of excitement caused by the event or condition" is not excluded from evidence by the hearsay rule. 31 The rationale behind Rule 803(2) is that
people who are under the influence of excitement triggered by an external startling event will not have the reflective capabilities necessary for
fabrication. 32 Some commentators disapprove of the rationale that sup30. See FED. R. Evmo. 803 (2) (establishing excited utterance exception to hearsay rule); Saltzburg, supra note 3, at 39 (observing that Rule 803(2) creates "wellknown, common law" excited utterance exception to hearsay rule).
31. See FED. R. EvmD. 803(2) (providing language for hearsay exception);
Saltzburg, supra note 3, at 39 ("The requirements of an excited utterance are met
when an individual witnesses a startling event or condition causing such stress that
the witness makes a statement relating to the cause of the stress.").
32. SeeUnited States v.Joy, 192 F.3d 761, 766 (7th Cir. 1999) ("This exception
is premised on the belief that a person is unlikely to fabricate lies (which presumably takes some deliberate reflection) while his mind is preoccupied with the stress
of an exciting event."); United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 127 (2d Cir. 1998)
(providing rationale for hearsay exception where declarant has limited capacity to
fabricate statements); Cole v. Tansy, 926 F.2d 955, 958 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding
unidentified witness' statement to fall within excited utterance exception to hearsay rule and that statement was not product of conscious reflection); David, 740
F.2d at 235 (holding that trial judge did not abuse discretion and that it was reasonable that declarant did not have time to fabricate); FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory
committee's note (urging spontaneity as key factor and that exclamations under
excited conditions are unfettered by conscious fabrication); SALTZBURG, supra note
16, at § 803.02[3] [a] (stating that excitement lessens reflective capacity, which provides for trustworthiness); WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at § 803.04[1] ("The premise
underlying the exception for excited utterances is that a person under the sway of
excitement precipitated by an external startling event will not have the reflective
capacity essential for fabrication."); WIGMORE, supra note 22, at § 1747 (explaining
that stress of nervous excitement produces spontaneous truthful responses to perceptions derived from external shock). But see Ferrier v. Duckworth, 902 F.2d 545,
548 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he excited utterance may not be as reliable a form of
hearsay as some have thought."); FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note (observing that theory of truthfulness spawned by excited state has been criticized and
that excitement potentially lessens accuracy of observation) (citing Robert M.
Hlutchins and Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Spontaneous Exclamations, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 432 (1928)); Stanley A. Goldman, Not So
"Firmly Rooted": Exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, 66 N.C. L. REv. 1, 31 (1987)
("Although strong emotion may negate the power to fabricate, it may also distort
the ability to observe or recall and thereby reduce the trustworthiness of the declarant's account."); Edmund M. Morgan, Res Gestae, 12 WASH. L. REv. 91, 98
(1937) (criticizing startling occurrence for res gestae "for it insists upon an element
which has a positive tendency to produce inaccurate observation-and inaccuracy
of observation is one of the greatest obstacles to the discovery of facts in litigation"); Orenstein, supra note 16, at 178-83 (critiquing excited utterance exception
on psychological grounds).
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ports the excited utterance exception.3 3 Despite this disapproval, the inconsider excited
ability to fabricate continues to be the reason why3courts
4
utterances trustworthy and allowable as evidence.
B.

How Courts Outside the Third Circuit Apply the
Excited Utterance Exception

The United States Circuit Courts of Appeals vary on how they determine what constitutes an excited utterance under Rule 803(2). 3 5 The
courts of appeals have developed a total of seven different methods to
determine whether hearsay evidence is admissible under the excited utterance exception. 36 This section discusses the various methods used by the
different circuits, later drawing from several of them to discuss possible
37
enhancements to the Third Circuit's approach.
1.

First, Seventh and Tenth Circuits' Three-Element Approach

The First, Seventh and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals utilize a threeelement test to establish what hearsay evidence is admissible under Rule
803(2).38 These three circuits apply the test of whether: "1) a startling
33. See Orenstein, supra note 16, at 197-212 (employing "a feminist method to
challenge the wisdom and fairness of the excited utterance exception"). For Professor Morgan's critical view of the reasoning supporting the excited utterance
exception, see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
34. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 357 (1992) (finding that excited utterance exception to hearsay rule is "firmly rooted" and trustworthy); Idaho v. Wright,
497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990) (claiming that basis for Rule 803(2) "is that such statements are given under circumstances that eliminate the possibility of fabrication,
coaching, or confabulation, and that therefore the circumstances surrounding the
making of the statement provide sufficient assurance that the statement is trustworthy and that cross-examination would be superfluous"); United States v. Brown,
254 F.3d 454, 458 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining that premise of excited utterance
exception is that excitement nullifies ability to reflect and fabricate); Joy, 192 F.3d
at 766-67 (discussing inability to deliberately reflect while exciting event flusters
declarant's mind); FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note (recognizing that
although some commentators criticize concept behind excited utterance exception, it nonetheless "finds support in cases without number").
35. For a discussion concerning the various methods of determining what
statements constitute excited utterances, see infra notes 38-88 and accompanying
text. In United States v. Brown, the Third Circuit explained that courts have. developed various methods for determining what are excited utterances. See Brown, 254
F.3d at 458 (noting popular three-element approach and Third Circuit's four-element approach).
36. For a discussion of these various methods, see infra notes 38-88 and accompanying text.
37. For a discussion concerning the enhancement of the Third Circuit methodology, see infra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
38. See Joy, 192 F.3d at 766 (pronouncing three elements that party seeking
admission of hearsay evidence must demonstrate); United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d
1095, 1109 (7th Cir. 1999) (allowing introduction of hearsay evidence if three conditions are met); United States v. Zizzo, 120 F.3d 1338, 1355 (7th Cir. 1997) (acknowledging that Rule 803(2) "comes into play only when" three factors met);
United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447, 453 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Hart-
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event or condition occurred; 2) [whether] the statement was made while
the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or
condition; and 3) [whether] the statement relates to the startling event or
condition." 39 There is rarely dispute as to whether the proponent admitting the hearsay has satisfied the first or third elements. 40 Thus, most of
the litigation concerns whether the test's second element is satisfied. 41
Courts addressing the stress of excitement requirement focus on whether
the declarant personally observed the startling event. 42 Furthermore, they
concentrate on whether the statement was a product of the declarant's
mental state caused by the startling event rather than focusing on rigid
43
time restrictions during which declarants can make excited utterances.
mann, 958 F.2d 774, 784 (7th Cir. 1992), for three conditions to meet in determining admission under exception); Martinez v. McCaughtry, 951 F.2d 130, 134-35
(7th Cir. 1991) (listing three requirements for excited utterance exception); Cole
v. Tansy, 926 F.2d 955, 958 (10th Cir. 1991) (setting forth three requirements);
United States v. Bailey, 834 F.2d 218, 228 (1st Cir. 1987) (accepting three exception elements developed by Seventh Circuit); United States v. Moore, 791 F.2d 566,
570 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 865 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1989) (applying exception only
when three conditions are met).
39. Moore, 791 F.2d at 570 (citing David v. Pueblo Supermarket, 740 F.2d 230,
235 (3d Cir. 1984)); see Joy, 192 F.3d at 766 (setting out three requirements); Hall,
165 F.3d at 1109 (same); United States v. Akins, 1998 WL 380509, at *1 (10th Cir.
1998) (same); Zizzo, 120 F.3d at 1355 (same); Sowa, 34 F.3d at 453 (same); Martinez, 951 F.2d at 134-35 (same); Tansy, 926 F.2d at 958 (same); Bailey, 834 F.2d at
228 (same). The United States Courts of Appeals use an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing trial courts' evidentiary decisions under this test. See Joy, 192
F.3d at 766 (noting abuse of discretion standard); United States v. Bradley, 145
F.3d 889, 892 (7th Cir. 1998) (same).
The United States Court of Appeals for District of Columbia essentially applies
the same test as the First, Seventh and Tenth Circuits, however, it does not apply it
in the same elemental fashion. See Hilyer v. Howat Concrete Co., Inc., 578 F.2d
422, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (establishing two prerequisites for excited utterances).
In Hilyer, the District of Columbia Circuit held:
[t]he statement clearly meets one of the two prerequisites for admission
as an excited utterance: it was "a statement relating to a startling event or
condition." We conclude that it also met the second prerequisite:.it was
made while the declarant, Simms, was "under the stress or excitement
cause [sic]by the event."
Id.
40. See Joy, 192 F.3d at 766 (noting that defendant conceded "that the first
and third criteria [of test] are satisfied").
41. See Zizzo, 120 F.3d at 1355 (observing that claim "bogs down" on step two
of excited utterance test).
42. See Joy, 192 F.3d at 766 (requiring that declarant personally observe startling event) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 145 F.3d 572, 576 (3d Cir. 1998)).
43. See id. (citing United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 127 (2d Cir. 1998)).
In Joy, the Seventh Circuit stated:
[Defendant] contends that his brother was not under the stress of the
excitement when he made the statements at issue, as several minutes had
passed. "An excited utterance need not be contemporaneous with the
startling event to be admissible under rule 803(2)." Rather, the utterance
must be contemporaneous with the excitement engendered by the startling event.
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The Fifth Circuit's Application of the Webb Test

The Fifth Circuit applies the Webb test, which is based on the test formulated in the Seventh Circuit case Webb v. Lane.44 This non-elemental
approach asks the question of "whether the statements were the product
of reflective thought or whether they were the result of the startling
event.1"4 5 When determining whether the statement is an excited utterance, the Fifth Circuit considers relevant, but not dispositive, the time
elapsed between the startling event and the hearsay statement. 4 6 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit, like the Seventh Circuit, focuses on the declarant's
47
mental state rather than deferring to the time elapsed.
3.

The Eighth Circuit'sMulti-Factor Test

The Eighth Circuit takes into account six relevant factors when considering whether a hearsay statement was an excited utterance to ensure
that "the statement was spontaneous, excited or impulsive rather than the
product of reflection and deliberation." 48 The six factors, set forth in
Id. (citations omitted); see also Hall, 165 F.3d at 1109 (noting that length of time
following startling event is not dispositive, but finding two days to be too much
time for conscious reflection); Akins, 1998 WL 380509, at *3 (stating that "lapse of
time does not necessarily negative the existence of an excited state" and recognizing previous case where court admitted excited utterance that happened nine
hours after startling event because declarant was under stress of startling event)
(citing Garcia v. Watkins, 604 F.2d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 1979)); Zizzo, 120 F.3d at
1355 (holding that declarant was not excited enough to preclude conscious reflection, considering that federal agents described declarant as calm and collected);
Sowa, 34 F.3d at 453 (intimating that time element is not controlling and, in this
case, essentially inconsequential considering that declarant remained under influence of excitement from startling event as he cried for twenty minutes after startling event occurred); Martinez, 951 F.2d at 135 ("Though John was not an
innocent bystander, the facts do support a finding that he was startled or excited at
the time of the statements."); Webb v. Lane, 922 F.2d 390, 394 (7th Cir. 1991)
("[I]t is well settled law in this circuit that the amount of time between the startling
event and the hearsay statement, although relevant, is not dispositive as to the
question of whether the statement is an excited utterance."); Moore, 791 F.2d at
572 (holding that time passage is not dispositive in determining whether statement
is excited utterance and that testimony that declarant was excited during statement
may be sufficient). But see Bailey, 834 F.2d at 228 ("It was satisfied that the time
lapse-apparently about three minutes-was short enough to warrant the conclu-

sion that Grant was still under the excitement of the event when she spoke.").
44. 922 F.2d 390; see United States v. Baptiste, 264 F.3d 578, 590-91 (5th Cir.
2001) (applying and citing Webb v. Lane, 922 F.2d 390, 394 (7th Cir. 1991)).
45. Id. at 590.
46. See id. at 590-91 (citing Webb for proposition that time elapsed is relevant).
47. See id. at 591 (holding that declarant's statements were not inadmissible
hearsay even though it was possible that thirty minutes had passed).
48. Reed v. Thalacker, 198 F.3d 1058, 1061-62 (8th Cir. 1999) (maintaining
that two-year-old's statement, made either days or months after event, required
cross examination and possibly was result of coaching); see United States v.
Marrowbone, 211 F.3d 452, 455 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding statements concerning
molestation charge were not excited utterances because of possible fabrication due
to lapse of time and declarant's age, motive to lie, and known actions); United
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United States v. Iron Shell 49 are: (1) the amount of time between the startling event and the statement; (2) whether the statement was the product
of an inquiry; (3) the declarant's age; (4) the declarant's physical and
mental condition; (5) the event's characteristics; and (6) the statement's
subject matter. 50 The courts in the Eighth Circuit efficaciously use these
factors to fairly determine what are excited utterances.5 1 A benefit of using these six factors is that it forces courts within the Eighth Circuit to
focus on whether the declarant was under the influence of continuing
stress and prevents them from concentrating too greatly on any one aspect
52
of the hearsay statement.
States v. Phelps, 168 F.3d 1048, 1054-55 (8th Cir. 1999). (finding no abuse of discretion in district court's holding that 911 call, phone call to friend and in-person
statements to officer were excited utterances); United States v. Martin, 59 F.3d 767,
769 (8th Cir. 1995) (admitting statements where declarant was "scared" and "nervous"); United States v. Moses, 15 F.3d 774, 778 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Given the seriousness of Morris's wound and the brief time that elapsed between the assault and
Finney's statement, it is evident that Finney was'still under the stress of excitement
of the assault when he made the statement."); United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d
77, 86 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that statement to officer was excited utterance
because of surprise of assault, assault's shocking nature and declarant's age).
49. 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980).
50. See Marrowbone, 211 F.3d at 454-55 (citing Moses for six factors to consider
whether hearsay statement was excited utterance); Reed, 198 F.3d at 1061 (same);
Phelps, 168 F.3d at 1054 (same); Martin, 59 F.3d at 769 (same); Moses, 15 F.3d at
777-78 (citing Iron Shell for six factors to consider whether hearsay statement was
excited utterance); Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 85-86 (setting forth six factors).
51. See Marrowbone, 211 F.3d at 455 (examining six factors and finding no excited utterance); Moses, 15 F.3d at 778 (applying three of six factors to find hearsay
statement admissible as excited utterance).
52. See Marrowbone, 211 F.3d at 455 ("L.D.'s actions also do not show continuous excitement or stress from the time of the event until the time of the statements."); Reed, 198 F.3d at 1061 ("The difficulty for the state in this case is that the
record fails to establish that VR's statements to her mother and the babysitter occurred while VR was under the continuing stress of the alleged sexual assault.");
Phelps, 168 F.3d at 1055 (finding excited utterances because during one statement
declarant "sounded upset," in another she was "scared and nervous," and in final
statement she was "visibly distraught"); Martin, 59 F.3d at 769 (holding that trial
court did not abuse its discretion in finding excited utterance exception because
declarant was scared and nervous); Moses, 15 F.3d at 778 (finding declarant was
"under the stress of excitement of the assault when he made the statement").
An interesting issue that the Eighth Circuit often considers concerns children
and excited utterances referring to sexual abuse. See Marrowbone, 211 F.3d at 455
(considering teenager's sexual abuse allegations); Reed, 198 F.3d at 1062 (finding
excited utterance exception did not apply for child's statement concerning sexual
abuse). In Reed, the Eighth Circuit discussed the view that children are "less likely
to fabricate a claim of sexual assault abuse because of their unfamiliarity with the
subject matter, and their limited capacity for conscious reflection motivated by selfinterest." Id. The Eighth Circuit, nonetheless, discounted this concept because "it
seems to us that infants are also significantly more likely to deliver a distorted
recollection." Id. In Marrowbone,however, the Eighth Circuit seemed to agree with
the rationale that children will not fabricate a story and contrasted a teenager's
"acute ability to deliberate and fabricate." Marrowbone, 211 F.3d at 455.
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The Fourth Circuit's Two-Element Approach

The Fourth Circuit applies a two-pronged test for determining
whether a hearsay statement is admissible as an excited utterance. 53 The
court requires: (1) the declarant to experience a startling event or condition, and (2) the declarant to react from the stress caused by the event and
not from reflection or fabrication. 54 Additionally, the Fourth Circuit considers five of the Eighth Circuit's six factors set forth in Iron Shell to determine if the declarant reacted under the stress of the startling event. 55 A
notable advantage is that the court does not rely heavily on the time
56
elapsed between the event and the statement.
5.

The Sixth Circuit's Three-Element Approach

The Sixth Circuit employs a three-part test that is distinct from the
First, Seventh and Tenth Circuits' three-part test.5 7 The Sixth Circuit admits hearsay statements under the excited utterance exception when: 1)
there is a startling event; 2) the declarant makes the statement before
53. See United States v. Widener, 1992 WL 42949, at *1 (4th Cir. 1992) (setting out two-prong test); Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 947 (4th Cir. 1988)
(establishing two-prong test).
54. See Widener, 1992 WL 42949 at *1 (citing Morgan, 846 F.2d at 947); Morgan,
846 F.2d at 947 ("To qualify as an excited utterance, the declarant must (1) have
experienced a startling event or condition and (2) reacted while under the stress
or excitement of that event and not from reflection and fabrication.").
The Sixth Circuit also applies a two-pronged test similar to the test used in the
Fourth Circuit. See United States v. McLennan, 563 F.2d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 1977)
(establishing two-pronged test). In McLennan, the Ninth Circuit established the
test for whether a hearsay statement qualifies under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. See id. (holding that statement did not fall within hearsay
exception). For a hearsay statement to be admissible as an excited utterance,
"[f]irst, there must be some occurrence or event sufficiently startling to render
normal reflective thought processes inoperative. Second, the statement of the declarant must have been a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event and not
the result of reflective thought." Id.; see also People v. Cepeda, 69 F.3d 369, 372
(9th Cir. 1995) (stating rule set out in McLennan). Although the Ninth Circuit's
test is nearly the same as the Fourth Circuit's test, the Ninth Circuit does not explicitly look to the factors set out in Iron Shell as the Fourth Circuit does. For a
further discussion of the Fourth Circuit's use of Iron Shell, see infra notes 54-55 and
accompanying text.
55. See Morgan, 846 F.2d at 947 (considering five of six factors developed in
Iron Shell but leaving out factor of whether statement was made in response to
inquiry).
56. See Widener, 1992 WL 42949 at *2 (holding statement was excited utterance even though time lapse was not precisely known).
57. Compare United States v. Moore, 791 F.2d 566, 570 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd
865 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1989) (requiring that "1) a startling event or condition
occurred; 2) the statement was made while the declarant was under the stress of
excitement caused by the event or condition; and 3) the statement relates to the
startling event or condition"), with Haggins v. Fort Pillow St. Farm, 715 F.2d 1050,
1057 (6th Cir. 1983) (requiring (1) startling event, (2) that statement be made
before time to fabricate and (3) that statement be made while under influence of
excitement caused by event).
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there is time to fabricate; and 3) the statement is made under the stress of
the event's excitement.5 8 The court gives great deference to the amount
of time between the event and the statement when determining the spontaneity of an excited utterance. 59 Nevertheless, it does consider other factors when making this determination and draws selectively from the six
factors developed in Iron Shell. 60
6.

The Second Circuit's Non-Elemental Method

The Second Circuit does not analyze any itemized components of a
hearsay statement when determining whether that statement is admissible
as an excited utterance. 61 Instead, the court simply tries to determine
whether the declarant was still under the excitement caused by the startling event. 62 This pure approach to the excited utterance exception allows courts within this circuit to focus on the actual mental state of the
63
declarant and the startling event's effects on him/her.
C.

The Third Circuit'sFour-Element Approach

The Third Circuit employs a novel four-part test, developed in Miller
v. Keating,6 4 to determine whether hearsay evidence is admissible as an
58. See Haggins, 715 F.2d at 1057 (setting out three-part test); see also United
States v. Taylor, 1992 WL 322369, at *4 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing Haggins).
59. See Haggins, 715 F.2d at 1057-58 (citing McCoRMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE
LAw OF EVIDENCE § 297 (2d ed. 1972)). In Haggins, the court noted that "the most
important of the many factors entering into this determination is the time factor[.]" Id. (citing McCormick).
60. See id. at 1058 (discussing Iron Shell and applying factors of declarant's age
and physical condition). In United States v. Wolak, the Sixth Circuit made a curious
statement about a declarant's absence at trial. See 923 F.2d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir.
1991) (discussing reasoning). In finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the statement, the Sixth Circuit considered the fact that
"[t] here was no claim that Carter was not available to testify and no foundation was
laid.., to explain his absence ....
IId. This fact should be irrelevant because the
excited utterance exception under the Federal Rules of Evidence, like all other
Rule 803 exceptions, allows courts to receive hearsay evidence without a showing
that the declarant is unavailable. For a further discussion about the unavailability
requirement, see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
61. See United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 128 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding
statement admissible as excited utterance because declarant was "all hyped up"
and "nervous"); United States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993, 1017 (2d Cir. 1990) (admitting hearsay statement because declarant was nervous even hours after crew beat
him up).
62. See Scarpa, 913 F.2d at 1017 ("There is little doubt that at the time Leon
gave the statements to Detective Rodenburg, he was still under the stress of excitement caused by his beating at the candy store, and by his sister's screams when

DeCarlo appeared at the hospital.").
63. See Tocco, 135 F.3d at 128 (focusing on nervous character of declarant);
Scarpa, 913 F.2d at 1017 (same).
64. 754 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1985).
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excited utterance. 65 None of the other circuits have adopted this approach. 66 When examining hearsay evidence for admissibility under the
excited utterance exception, the Third Circuit requires: "(1) a startling
occasion, (2) a statement relating to the circumstances of the startling occasion, (3) a declarant who appears to have had opportunity to observe
personally the events, and (4) a statement made before there has been
67
time to reflect and fabricate."
Several issues can arise while litigating the excited utterance excep68
tion'to the hearsay rule under the Third Circuit's four-part formulation.
One minor problem that appears is whether the first prong is met-that is,
whether the startling event even occurred. 69 Litigators, however, can
quickly dispose of this argument considering "the generally prevailing rule
65.. See United States v. Brown, 254 F.3d 454, 458 (3d Cir. 2001) (contrasting
common requirements for determining whether excited utterance exception applies with Third Circuit's requirements).
66. See Brown, 254 F.3d at 458 ("In the Third Circuit, we have expanded the
requirements of admissibility [for excited utterances] ....").
67. Miller, 754 F.2d at 510; see also Brown, 254 F.3d at 458-59 (applying fourpart excited utterance test to determine whether statements concerning man with
gun were excited utterances); United States v. Mitchell, 145 F.3d 572, 576 (3d Cir.
1998) (reciting four-part test and determining whether note concerning car
change at robbery was excited utterance); Coyle v. Kristjan Palusalu Maritime Co.,
Ltd., 83 F. Supp. 2d 535, 542-44 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (applying four-part test to two
statements concerning fall taken by man and finding one statement admissible as
excited utterance and other inadmissible as hearsay); Boucher v. Grant, 74 F.
Supp. 2d 444, 450-51 (D.N.J. 1999) (holding that statement made concerning car
accident was admissible as excited utterance under four-part excited utterance formulation); Shinners v. K-Mart Corp., 847 F. Supp. 31, 34 (D. Del. 1994) (holding
unidentified declarant's statement inadmissible because of failure to meet heavier
burden for unidentified declarant established in Miller).
This four-part test, however, has not always been the test the Third Circuit has
utilized to determine which statements are excited utterances. In 1984, the Third
Circuit used a three-part test, set forth in David v. Pueblo Supermarket, 740 F.2d 230
(3d Cir. 1984), and less than a year later, noted a two-part test in'United States v.
Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985). Within a month of the Downing decision,
however, the Third Circuit devloped the four-part test in Miller that is the current
standard used to determine what statement are considered excited utterances. See
Brown, 254 F.3d at 458-59 (utilizing four-part Miller test for excited utterance exception to hearsay rule).
68. See generally Brown, 254 F.3d at 458-62 (discussing issues of whether startling event occurred and whether statement was product of reflection and
fabrication); Mitchell, 145 F.3d at 576-77 (analyzing whether declarant personally
perceived event and whether declarant was under stress of excitement caused by
event); Miller, 754 F.2d at 510-12 (addressing problem of personal perception);
Coyle, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 543 (finding no excited utterance because problem concerning whether wire placement was personally perceived); Boucher, 74 F. Supp. 2d
at 451 (discussing "whether Grant was 'under the stress of excitement' while speaking to Boucher 'immediately after the accident"'); Shinners, 847 F. Supp. at 34
(failing to find that plaintiffs met heavier burden for unidentified declarant).
69. See Brown, 254 F.3d at 459 ("Brown contends . ..that the government
failed to provide evidence of the startling event .... )..
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that an excited utterance may of itself be sufficient to establish the star70
ling event."
Likewise, it is a relatively minor issue as to whether a party has satisfied the second prong of the test. 7 1 A disputable issue that litigators need
to deal with, however, is whether the declarant personally perceived the
startling occasion. 7 2 The Third Circuit does not require direct proof of
personal perception but utilizes a preponderance standard when evaluating the statement. 73 Thus, courts cannot draw an inference of personal
perception when the words of the statement or the surrounding circumstances do not "show more likely than not that the declarant saw the
event."' 74 It is the vague and case-specific nature of this preponderance of
75
the evidence standard that exposes the test's third prong to litigation.
70. Id. In Brown, the Third Circuit cited a decision from the Seventh Circuit
and also decisions from several state courts for the proposition that the declarant's
statement was sufficient to establish that the startling event occurred. See id. (citing
courts from Colorado, Minnesota, West Virginia, Texas and Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Moore, 791 F.2d 566, 571 (7th Cir. 1986)). The Third Circuit
also cited the advisory committee note for Rule 803(2) to demonstrate that this
method of establishing the startling event is the "prevailing practice." See id. (noting that if hearsay statement itself did not establish startling event, too much valuable evidence would be excluded). Judge Rendell, however, who dissented in
Brown, disagreed with the proposition that a hearsay statement, alone, can verify
that a startling occasion occurred. See id. at 465 (disapproving of majority's application of excited utterance exception). Judge Rendell stated that "[w]hile the majority's view may be 'the majority view,' that does not remove the need for an
assessment on a case-by-case basis of the appropriate ruling regarding admissibility.
The unique factual setting presented here required a different result." Id.
71. See Miller, 754 F.2d at 510-11 ("There is ...little doubt that the declarant's
statement relates to the circumstances of the occurrence."); Coyle, 83 F. Supp. 2d at
542 ("Finally, it is clear that Mr. Coyle's statement that he backed into the wire...
is related to the startling event of falling."); Boucher, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 451 (disposing quickly of first three elements of excited utterance exception).
72. See Mitchell, 145 F.3d at 576 (noting that appellant's "principal challenge"
to admission of hearsay evidence is whether declarant personally perceived what
statement contained); Miller, 754 F.2d at 511-12 (addressing personal knowledge
problem); Coyle, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 543 (holding that plaintiff cannot show that
statement was based on personal perception).
73. See Miller, 754 F.2d at 511 ("Direct proof of perception, or proof that forecloses all speculation is not required."); Coyle, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 543 (stating that
proof that removes all speculation is not necessary). In Miller, the Court of Appeals suggested that the statement itself can, under certain circumstances, prove
personal perception by a preponderance of the evidence. See 754 F.2d at 511 (noting in dicta that statement itself can help establish admissibility).
74. Coyle, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 543 (quoting Billebault v. DiBattiste, No. Civ. A. 966501, 1999 WL 191648, *7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 1999)). This preponderance of the
evidence test for determining personal perception is also set out in Miller and
Mitchell. See Mitchell 145 F.3d at 577 (applying preponderance of evidence test);
Miller, 754 F.2d at 511 (same).
75. See Mitchell, 145 F.3d at 577 (noting that even though "the government
argues that '[a] common sense reading of the note suggests that the person writing the note was perceiving the event and in close proximity,' . . . the record here
is devoid of circumstances indicating by a preponderance that the author of the
anonymous note actually saw Mitchell change cars"); Miller, 754 F.2d at 511 (sug-

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002

15

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 5 [2002], Art. 4
1132

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47: p. 1117

Furthermore, when the identity of the declarant is unknown, proving the
third prong of the test becomes even more complicated. 76 The cases have
suggested a "heavier" burden when proving that an anonymous declarant
personally perceived a startling event. 77 Nevertheless, Third Circuit courts
have applied a preponderance standard to prove personal perception of
78
both identified and unidentified declarants.
The final significant hurdle for litigators trying to admit an excited
utterance in the Third Circuit concerns the temporal limitations involved
when considering whether a declarant has had time to "reflect and fabricate." 79 The question the courts ask is whether the declarant's statement
"likely occurred during the period of excitement engendered by their

gesting several circumstances under which declarant could have made statement
without actually personally observing event).
76. See Mitchell, 145 F.3d at 576 (citing Miller for proposition that parties need

to meet heavier burden for third prong when attempting to admit statement of
unidentified declarant); Miller, 754 F.2d at 511 ("[C]ircumstantial evidence of the
declarant's personal perception must not be so scanty as to forfeit the 'guarantees
of trustworthiness' which form the hallmark of all exceptions to the hearsay rule.")
(citing FED. R. EVmD. 803 advisory committee's note).
77. See Miller, 754 F.2d at 510 ("A party seeking to introduce such a statement
carries a burden heavier than where the declarant is identified to demonstrate the
statement's circumstantial trustworthiness."); see also Mitchell, 145 F.3d at 576 (relying on Miller formulation).
78. Compare Mitchell 145 F.3d at 577 (applying preponderance of evidence
test to determine whether anonymous note established personal perception) and
Miller, 754 F.2d at 511 (using preponderance of evidence test and finding that
record did not establish that anonymous declarant saw other driver "cut in"), with
Coyle, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 543 (applying preponderance of evidence test to whether

identified declarant personally perceived event). The drawback to comparing

Coyle with Mitchell and Miller is that the second statement in Coyle could easily be
considered a statement about an event that is not startling, while the statements in
Mitchell and Miller are more clearly "related" to a startling event. See Mitchell, 145

F.3d at 577 (noting statement of anonymous note concerning switching cars dur-

ing robbery); Miller, 754 F.2d at 511 (premising holding on statement that concerned car accident); Coyle, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 543 (discussing statement about wire
placement and not about startling event of plaintiffs fall plaintiff took). Thus, the
statement in Coyle and the statements in Millerand Mitchell are not completely analogous, but the courts nonetheless apply the preponderance standard for personal
observation to both identified and unidentified declarants. See Mitchell, 145 F.3d at

577 (applying preponderance of evidence test for personal observation of anony-

mous declarant); Miller, 754 F.2d at 511 (same); Coyle, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 543 (applying preponderance of evidence test for personal observations of known declarant).
79. See United States v. Brown, 254 F.3d 454, 460 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Brown also
asserts that the government failed to satisfy the fourth criterion of the Mitchell test:

that the statements were made before declarants had time to reflect and fabricate."); Mitchell, 145 F.3d at 577 (noting that evidence did not suggest that statement was made before time to reflect and fabricate); Miller, 754 F.2d at 512 ("The
circumstances external to the statement itself.., fail to show that the declarant was
excited when he spoke."); Boucher v. Grant, 74 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451 (D.N.J. 1999)
("[T]his Court must make a determination whether Grant was 'under the stress of
excitement' while speaking to Boucher 'immediately after the accident."').
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sighting of the [startling event] ."80 An affirmative answer assures courts
that the statement was not a product of conscious reflection. 81 The Third
Circuit, however, does not answer this question by directly regarding the
declarant's mental state. 82 Instead, the courts rely on the amount of time
that had passed since the startling event occurred to ascertain whether the
83
declarant was still under the influence of the excitement of the event.
Although time is not claimed to be the determinative factor in making an
84
excited utterance decision, it is given substantial consideration at times.
IV.

ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES V. BROWN AND POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENT
OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S EXCITED UTTERANCE LAw

On June 21, 2001, the Third Circuit delivered its opinion' in United
States v. Brown.85 In Brown, the court reaffirmed its adherence to the four86
element approach formulated in Miller v. Keating.
A.

Facts of United States v. Brown

At 10:50 pm on May 25, 1998, Police Officer Michael Hughes was investigating a missing youth report on Clinton Street in Camden, New
80. Brown, 254 F.3d at 460; see also Boucher, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 451 (making
determination whether declarant was under stress of excitement and whether state
of mind "ruled out the possibility of conscious reflection").
81. See Miller,754 F.2d at 512 ("The assumption underlying the hearsay exception of Rule 803(2) is that a person under the sway of excitement temporarily loses
the capacity of reflection and thus produces statements free of fabrication.").
82. See Brown, 254 F.3d at 461 (relying on elapsed time). In Brown, the Third
Circuit held that:
it was entirely reasonable for the District Court to infer from the testimony that only a short time had passed between the startling event and
the statements, that the declarants were still visibly in an excited state,
that their statements thus were likely made in a state of excitement
originating with the event, and consequently that their statements were
admissible as excited utterances pursuant to Rule 80.3(2).
Id. But see Miller, 754 F.2d at 512 (answering question directly by holding "it is not
necessarily an abuse of discretion to admit the statement so long as the trial court
explicitly finds it was not the product of conscious reflection").
83. See Brown, 254 F.3d at 460 (discussing Second, Eighth and Tenth Circuit
decisions concerning elapsed time and its relation to excited utterance); Mitchell,
145 F.3d at 577 (refusing to apply excited utterance exception because "trial court
could not reasonably find that there was no time to fabricate the statement");
Boucher, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 451 ("The brief lapse of time coupled with [defendant's]
mental state cannot give rise to a finding of conscious reflection.").
84. See Mitchell, 145 F.3d at 577 (citing Third and Seventh Circuit cases concerning excited utterance time allowances and holding that in present case
enough time could have elapsed for fabrication); Miller, 754 F.2d at 512 (stating
proposition that there are no arbitrary time limits for operation of Rule 803(2),
and basing decision on McCurdy v. Greyhound Corp., 346 F.2d 224, 226 (3d Cir.
1965)).
85. 254 F.3d at 454.
86. See id. at 458 (citing Miller v. Keating).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002

17

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 5 [2002], Art. 4
1134

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47: p. 1117

Jersey.8 7 While there, two nervous men approached him and yelled, in an
excited tone, that there was a man approximately two blocks away who had
a gun and was threatening to shoot somebody.88 Officer Hughes and the
two men found Brown, a block and a half away from where the men originally saw him, brandishing a gun. 89 Officer Hughes radioed for help, sub90
dued Brown and then arrested him.
Federal authorities prosecuted Brown for possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon. 9 1 "When Officer Hughes testified at trial that the two
men had told him about the man waving the gun and saying he was going
92
to shoot somebody, Brown's attorney objected and requested a mistrial."
The trial court issued a memorandum opinion admitting Officer Hughes'
testimony as an excited utterance. 93 Brown was subsequently convicted
and sentenced to seventy-eight months in prison. 94 Brown appealed his
95
conviction, but the Third Circuit affirmed the trial court's opinion.
B.

The Legal Analysis in Brown

In Brown, the Third Circuit held that the testimony of Officer
Hughes, which included the statements of the two men who approached
him about Brown's dangerous behavior, was properly admitted in the trial
court under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. 96 The
court began its analysis by recognizing that excited utterances are admissible hearsay evidence because "excitement suspends the declarant's powers
of reflection and fabrication, consequently minimizing the possibility that
the utterance will be influenced by self interest and therefore rendered
unreliable." 97 The court then proceeded to recite the four-element test
used to determine which hearsay statements are admissible under the ex98
cited utterance exception.
87. See Brown, 254 F.3d at 456 (discussing reason Hughes was dispatched to
Clinton Street).
88. See id. at 456-57 (recounting testimony of Officer Hughes).
89. See id. at 457 (approximating distance at one and one half blocks).
90. See id. (noting that ammunition in Brown's gun was not chambered and
that firing pin was broken).
91. See id. ("In light of Brown's prior federal convictions for six counts of
armed robbery and other convictions for automobile theft and possession of a
loaded firearm, the gun possession case was referred to federal authorities for
prosecution.").
92. Id.
93. See id. (explaining procedural history).
94. See id. (stating that three-year term of supervised release would follow
Brown's prison term).
95. See id. at 462 (affirming trial court).
96. See id. (stating holding of court).
97. Id. at 458 (citing Seventh Circuit decision in United States v. Joy).
98. See id. (citing prior Third Circuit decisions in United States v. Mitchell and
Miller v. Keating). For a discussion concerning the application of the Third Circuit's four-element excited utterance test, see supranotes 64-88 and accompanying
text.
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After establishing the Third Circuit's precedent concerning the excited utterance exception, the court addressed Brown's arguments concerning why the trial court should not have admitted Officer Hughes'
hearsay testimony.9 9 Brown's first contention was that the prosecution did
not succeed in providing any evidence of the startling event other than
Hughes' testimony concerning the hearsay statements themselves.100 The
court, however, denied the merit of this argument, stating the "generally
prevailing rule that an excited utterance may of itself be sufficient to establish the occurrence of the startling event." 1° 1
The court then attended to the issue of whether the declarants made
10 2
the hearsay statements before they had time to reflect and fabricate.
The court held that the declarants made the statements before they had
time to fabricate, and based this decision on the concept that Federal Rule
of Evidence 803(2) does not require that the statement be contemporaneous with the event's excitement.' 0 3 Here, the Third Circuit agreed with
the trial court that the declarants made the statements under the excitement caused by the event because the trial court could reasonably "infer
from the testimony that only a short time had passed between the startling
event and the statements, [and] that the declarants were still visibly in an
excited state.
...
104 Although the court ultimately held that the statements were admissible because of the excited mental state of the declarants, it nonetheless centered much of its discussion on the time lapse
between a startling event and an excited utterance, basing its final deci05
sion on the "short time" that transpired in the case.'
C.

Positive Aspects of the Third Circuit's Four-PartApproach

The Third Circuit's four-element test to determine if a hearsay statement is admissible as an excited utterance is valuable because it encourages courts to fulfill the vision of the framers of Federal Rule of Evidence
803(2).106 The framers of Rule 803(2) determined that excited utter99. See id. at 459-61 (considering Brown's arguments).
100. See id. at 459 (discussing contentions).
101. Id. (citing United States v. Moore, 791 F.2d 566, 571 (7th Cir. 1986)). In
Brown, the Third Circuit noted that academic commentators as well as most jurisdictions find that the hearsay statements in themselves are sufficient proof of the
startling event. See id. (requiring no independent corroborating evidence).
102. See id. at 460 (skipping issues of whether prosecution satisfied third and
fourth criteria of Third Circuit's excited utterance test).
103. See id. (discounting idea that hearsay statements need to be contemporaneous with event to be admissible under excited utterance exception).
104. Id. at 461.
105. See id. at 460-61 (citing multiple case holdings concerning amount of
time courts have allowed to transpire between startling event and excited
utterance).
106. See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note ("The theory of Exception [paragraph] (2) is simply that circumstances may produce a condition of excitement which temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces
utterances free of conscious fabrication.").
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ances should be admitted because people who experience startling events
often lack the ability to fabricate stories while under the influence of the
event's excitement. 10 7 Thus, by requiring courts to find a startling event, a
statement relating to the event, a declarant who personally has observed
the event and a statement made before there has been time to fabricate,
the Third Circuit attempts to assure that no court will admit unreliable
10 8
hearsay evidence.
D.

The Third Circuit'sAdoption of Iron Shell Factors

The Third Circuit should consider adopting the six factors set out in
the Eighth Circuit case United States v. Iron Shell.' 0 9 As discussed in Part III,
the Eighth Circuit, in Iron Shell, developed six guiding factors to determine
if a hearsay statement was "spontaneous, excited or impulsive rather than
the product of reflection and deliberation." '11 0 These six factors include
the amount of time between the startling event and the statement,
whether the statement was the product of an inquiry, the declarant's age,
the declarant's physical and mental condition, the event's characteristics
and the statement's subject matter.1 1 Litigators in the Third Circuit are
often presented with the issue of whether the declarant personally perceived the startling occasion.' 12 Accordingly, if the Third Circuit adopted
and applied the six Iron Shell factors, litigators practicing in the Third Circuit would have more guidance when determining whether a declarant
personally perceived the event because the declarant's physical and
mental condition, the event's characteristics and the statement's subject
matter would all be relevant.' 13
E.

Lessening the Third Circuit'sFocus on Time Lapse

Courts in the Third Circuit should not rely too greatly on the time
lapse between a startling event and the declarant's statement when deter107. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at § 803.04[1] ("The premise underlying
the exception for excited utterances is that a person under the sway of excitement
precipitated by an external startling event will not have the reflective capacity essential for fabrication."); WIGMORE, supra note 22, at § 1747 (stating that excitement caused by startling events produces spontaneous truthful responses).
108. See Brown, 254 F.3d at 458 (citing Mitchell and Miller for four-part test); see
also id. at 461 (holding that trial court reasonably admitted hearsay testimony because declarants were under influence of excitement caused by startling event and
therefore did not have ability to reflect and fabricate under fourth criterion).
109. 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980).
110. Id. at 86. For a discussion of the Iron Shell factors, see supra notes 47-60
and accompanying text.
111. See Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 85-86 (setting out six factors for evaluating excited utterance).
112. For a further discussion of the issue concerning whether the hearsay declarant actually perceived the event, see supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
113. See United States v. Phelps, 168 F.3d 1048, 1054-55 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding no abuse of discretion in district court's holding that 911 call, phone call to
friend and in-person statements to officer were excited utterances).
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mining whether hearsay evidence qualifies as an excited utterance. In
Brown, the Third Circuit concluded that the hearsay statements were
"likely made in a state of excitement originating with the event" by initially
noting the "short time [that] had passed between the startling event and
the statements ....-114 Courts in the Third Circuit may overlook the
primary rationale for the excited utterance exception by focusing too intently on rigid time restrictions when making excited utterance determinations.' 1 5 By focusing on time restrictions, a court runs the risk of not
admitting an excited utterance that furthers the rationale for the exception simply because too much time has elapsed. Thus, the Third Circuit
should consider adopting the philosophy of the First, Seventh and Tenth
Circuits that concentrates on whether the statement was a product of the
declarant's mental state caused by the startling event rather than the time
16
frame between the event and the statement.'
V.

CONCLUSION

Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2) codifies the common-law excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule that admits hearsay evidence when a
declarant makes a statement "relating to a startling event or condition...
while the declarant [is] under the stress of excitement caused by the event
or condition."' 1 7 The excited utterance exception is a valuable exception
to the hearsay rule because the circumstances under which declarants
make excited utterances assure the trustworthiness of the hearsay evidence. 118 Although some commentators do not agree that excited utterances can provide courts with reliable hearsay evidence, the weight of
authority maintains that excited utterances are nonetheless trustworthy
due to the declarant's inability to reflect and fabricate while under the
influence of stress relating to a startling event."19
Litigators practicing in the Third Circuit need to be aware of the intricacies of the Third Circuit's four-element test to effectively argue whether
or not to admit hearsay evidence as an excited utterance. The Third Circuit still utilizes the four-element test it developed in Miller v. Keating to
determine when a hearsay statement is admissible under the excited utter114. Brown, 254 F.3d at 461.

115. See United States v. Mitchell, 145 F.3d 572, 577 (3d Cir. 1998) (reaching
decision through analysis that declarant could have had time to fabricate rather
than whether declarant's mental state reduced ability to fabricate).
116. See United States v. Akins, No. 97-3353, 1998 WL 380509, at *3 (10th Cir.
July 8, 1998) (stating that "lapse of time does not necessarily negative the existence
of an excited state" and recognizing previous case where court admitted excited
utterance that happened nine hours after startling event because declarant was
under stress of exciting event).
117. FED. R. EvID. 803(2).
118. For a discussion on the rationale for the excited utterance exception to
the hearsay rule, see supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
119. For a discussion on counterviews to the rationale for the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, see supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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ance exception. 120 For hearsay evidence to be admissible under the excited utterance exception, the Third Circuit requires "(i) a startling
occasion; (ii) a statement relating to the circumstances of the startling occasion; (iii) a declarant who appears to have had opportunity to observe
personally the events; and (iv) a statement made before there has been
time to reflect and fabricate." 12 1 Practitioners must be able to effectively
dispute the arguments that commonly arise under these four elements
and also must recognize and avoid contentions that the Third Circuit continually finds meritless. 122 Furthermore, litigators should argue that the
Third Circuit enhance and clarify its excited utterance law by adopting the
Eighth Circuit's Iron Shell factors and by focusing less on the time lapse
between the startling event and the excited utterance and more on the
declarant's state of mind.
Matthew D. Janssen

120: See United States v. Brown, 254 F.3d 454, 458 (3d Cir. 2001) (using Miller
formulation in evaluating excited utterance exception to hearsay rule).
121. Id.
122. For a discussion of Brown's contentions that the Third Circuit found
meritless, see supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
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